Lippmann's thoroughgoing pessimism may lead us to a better understanding of the role of communication in public deliberations between scientists and citizens.
We teachers of argument have nothing to apologize for.
Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice.
Argumentation, while it seldom resolves issues, does create conditions under which collective intentions can more securely be ascribed.
But how do people who disagree--often deeply--manage to locate the shared premises they need in order to have an argument?
What practical means do arguers who have little motivation to cooperate with each other nevertheless manage to force each other to make some propositions the unchallenged starting points or premises of arguments?
"Issue" is a central regulatory concept within argumentative practice; the issues are what we argue about. In this paper, I develop a theory of issues, and in particular, the practical means arguers have for forcing others to attend to their issues.