Browsing All posts tagged under »normative pragmatic approach«

Norms of advocacy

October 16, 2013

0

In  Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013, edited by D. Mohammed & M. Lewiński. Windsor, ON: OSSA, 2013. This essay advances an account of the ordinary speech activity of advocating. The ethical principles developed within advocacy professions such as law […]

L’autorità di Wikipedia

July 4, 2013

1

Sistemi Intelligenti 25 (2013) 9-38; very kindly translated by Fabio Paglieri from the original. Philosophers of argumentation and of testimony suggest that we can rely on what someone says because of its epistemic merits. If so, then we should never credit Wikipedia, since we cannot assess what its anonymous contributors know. I propose instead that […]

Lippmann, the indispensable opposition

July 14, 2012

0

Lippmann's thoroughgoing pessimism may lead us to a better understanding of the role of communication in public deliberations between scientists and citizens.

What is ‘responsible advocacy’ in science? Good advice.

July 14, 2012

0

"Responsible" advocacy is still advocacy. To be good, it should be zealous. But zeal undermines scientific authority. So advising, not advocating, should be the speech act of choice.

Accounting for the appeal to the authority of experts

July 14, 2012

0

Experts have methods for earning the trust of lay audiences--but using their authority is costly. I explain how.

Theoretical pieties, Johnstone’s impiety, and ordinary views of argumentation

July 14, 2012

0

We teachers of argument have nothing to apologize for.

Argument has no function

July 14, 2012

0

Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice.

Institutions for argument: Cultivating the formation of collective intent

July 13, 2012

0

Argumentation, while it seldom resolves issues, does create conditions under which collective intentions can more securely be ascribed.

Designing premises

July 13, 2012

0

But how do people who disagree--often deeply--manage to locate the shared premises they need in order to have an argument?

Manifestly adequate premises

July 13, 2012

0

What practical means do arguers who have little motivation to cooperate with each other nevertheless manage to force each other to make some propositions the unchallenged starting points or premises of arguments?

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.