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The Pragmatic Force of Making an Argument

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Abstract
Making arguments makes reasons apparent. Sometimes those reasons may affect audiences' relationships to claims (e.g., accept, adhere). But an over-emphasis on audience effects encouraged by functionalist theories of argumentation distracts attention from other things that making arguments can accomplish. We advance the normative pragmatic program on argumentation through two case studies of how early advocates for women's suffrage in the U.S. made reasons apparent in order to show that what they were doing wasn't ridiculous. While it might be possible to identify this as a new function of argumentation, we encourage instead attention to a more important question: explaining how all the diverse uses of argument have pragmatic force.

Keywords Argumentation · Argument · Pragmatic theories of argumentation · Function of argumentation · Force of argumentation · Normative pragmatics

1 Introduction

Over the past 20 years there has been increasing focus on pragmatic theories of argumentation. In Fig. 1 we attempt to represent in a neutral way the assumptions shared by these theories. At its most basic, a pragmatic theory asks us to understand what O'Keefe (1982) termed argument$_1$s—the premise/conclusion units people exchange with each other—by placing them in the context of the argument$_2$s in which they occur—the transactions between speakers and audiences. A speaker, S, makes an argument$_1$ to A, the auditor; the argument$_1$ is part of a more extensive communicative activity by S (represented by the grey box; see Goodwin 2000; Jacobs 2000) that takes place in the context of a transaction between S and A (represented by the two-way arrow).

Functionalist theories of argumentation are one subset of pragmatic theories—probably the dominant one. As Mohammed has pointed out in her recent, incisive article (2016), functionalist theories pick out some argumentative activity—either the entire interaction or just the making of the argument$_1$—and assert that it has an "intrinsic goal." As Mohammed further points out, the intrinsic goals that have been put forward are quite varied. For example, perhaps the intrinsic goal of the argumentative activity is to:

> justify *c* to A (Bermejo-Luque 2010, perhaps)
> invite A to infer *c* (Pinto 2001, since partially reconsidered in, 2009)
> increase A's adherence to *c* (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; the view often ascribed to a rhetorical approach to argumentation)
> rationally persuade A that *c* (Johnson 2000)
> critically test *c*, in order to induce A to accept *c* as a standpoint, thus rationally resolving the disagreement between A and S (pragma-dialectical theories generally)

There are important (and unresolved) differences among these views. But all share a focus on A, the audience addressed, and that audience's relationship to *c*, the conclusion being argued for (see Fig. 2). Functionalist theories stipulate that S's argumentative activity is aimed to change either A's cognitive attitude towards *c* (e.g., infer, adhere, be persuaded) or to change his "external" activities with respect to *c* (e.g., openly accept as a standpoint). A functionalist theory of argumentation investigates the conditions that have

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

Fig. 1 Elements of any pragmatic theory of argumentation



Fig. 2 The focus of functionalist theories of argumentation

to exist for the specified function to be realized; these lead to norms for argumentation.[1]

Work in the normative pragmatic approach to argumentation shares the functionalist commitment to developing a pragmatic theory, but has critiqued functionalism as leading to impoverished views of argumentation (Goodwin 2001b, c, 2007a, b; Innocenti 2011a, b). For example, functionalist theories analyze arguments by reconstructing them to fit an ideal model (a critical discussion, negotiation dialogue, eristic dialogue, and so on), and evaluate them by deducing from the ideal model norms, rules, guidelines, codes of conduct, and the like for good argumentation. What falls through the cracks of this mode of theorizing includes an account of strategies social actors actually use in addition to or instead of making argument$_1$s (Goodwin 2000; Jacobs 2000, 2006), what norms social actors actually bring to bear in a situation (Kauffeld 1998), and why social actors can reasonably expect just making those utterances, including making argument$_1$s, to accomplish something (Goodwin 2001a; Innocenti and Miller 2016).

Normative pragmatic theories begin with actual communication transactions and assume that social actors in communicative interactions self-regulate—that social actors are not beholden to rules, conventions, and the like that they may not even know, recognize, acknowledge, and so on, but nonetheless hold more or less sophisticated and tacit understandings of situations where they make utterances, including making argument$_1$s, in order to accomplish something. Normative pragmatic theories attempt to account for the full range of communication strategies, including making argument$_1$s, and to explain why social actors can reasonably expect just the making of those utterances to have some effect, including effects in addition to or instead of changing A's relationship to *c*.

Here, we want to continue to urge an enlargement of view of uses of argument$_1$s by shifting attention from what making an argument$_1$ does to an audience to an even more basic, prior effect: making reasons apparent. We will present normative pragmatic analyses of two case studies demonstrating how making argument$_1$s accomplishes important tasks that have nothing to do with changing A's relationship to *c*. Instead, it is simply S's putting *p* ∴ *c* out there in the world that has an effect; S does something worth doing by making

[1] For example, assume that the function of argumentation is to resolve a disagreement. That can only happen if one side or the other eventually gives in. A functionalist theory would therefore posit a norm like "a failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts" (van Eemeren et al. 2002, p. 183).



Fig. 3 The argumentative activity that is the focus of this paper

$p \therefore c$ apparent,[2] by making $p \therefore c$ manifest, by making $p \therefore c$ explicit, by showing $p \therefore c$—that is, by making an argument$_1$ (see Fig. 3). In each case study we will see:

1. S makes an argument$_1$.
2. S cannot expect A to accept (etc.) *c*.
3. S does *something* by making an argument$_1$.

As we will argue in the conclusion, the "something" that gets done when an argument$_1$ is made in these cases is probably not worth calling a "function." Instead, we argue that pragmatic theories should be trying to explain argumentation's *force*.

In what follows we will first describe what we mean by "force." We will then draw two case studies from the early women's suffrage movement in the US: one from 1848, one from 1869 to 1875. While women in the mid-nineteenth century were achieving important gains, little advance was made or reasonably could be made on obtaining the right to vote. As we will show, throughout the period deeply entrenched beliefs made the idea of women voting ridiculous. In these circumstances, it was not reasonable to expect that making argument$_1$s would change audiences' relationships to *c*, the claim that women should be able to vote. Nevertheless, advocates used argument$_1$s, and to good effect.

[2] "Making $p \therefore c$ apparent" can be read as "making a reason apparent," or even more exactly, as "making apparent *that p* is a reason for *c*" (and similarly for the other expressions).

2 Pragmatic Force

We use the phrase "pragmatic force" to refer to pressure generated just by making utterances and the commitments, obligations, responsibilities, and the like undertaken in the course of making the utterances. To explain pragmatic force, we first distinguish it from other kinds of force or pressure that may be generated when a speaker makes argument$_1$s (Manolescu 2005). These forces are not mutually exclusive; we can separate them analytically but not practically. We then explain how our current investigation into effects of putting $p \therefore c$ out there in the world builds theory from the grounds of actual social actors using argument$_1$s.

Perhaps the kind of force most familiar to scholars and students of argumentation is intellectual force, or pressure to accept a claim generated by the acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency of premises. An account of intellectual force would say the pressure generated to accept the claim that women have the right to vote comes from the syllogistic (Burke 1968) or quasi-logical (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) form of the premises that women are U.S. citizens and U.S. citizens have the right to vote. Intellectual force is relatively asituational insofar as standards of rationality may be suprapersonal. Accounts of this kind of force orient researchers toward describing the sounds of logical coherence and prescribing rules for assessing argument cogency.

Another kind of force generated by making argument$_1$s is social or conventional. An account of social or conventional force would say the pressure generated to accept the claim that to be a citizen is to be a voter by supporting it with reference to the U.S. Constitution, New York State Constitution, and U.S. Supreme Court Dred Scott decision comes from intersubjective agreements among actors in an institution, such as a law court, about what count as good reasons. Accounts of this kind of force orient researchers toward describing social or institutional rules, conventions, and the like.

We are calling researchers to attend to pragmatic force generated by making utterances, in this case making argument$_1$s. Making argument$_1$s generates pragmatic force by changing the context such that new reasons for influence—reasons beyond those given in argument$_1$s—are created by making argument$_1$s. Consider how a social or conventional account of force differs from a pragmatic account in the case of explaining why the strategy of setting up a line divider influences theater patrons to queue up (Innocenti and Miller 2016). Why do theater patrons routinely take a place at the end of a long, orderly line marked by a line divider even if they could easily step over it and move to the front of the line, and even if they hold negative attitudes about standing in long lines? One account is that they are

acting conventionally: it is conventional for patrons to queue up next to a line divider rather than step over it and cut in line, and socially unacceptable to act contrary to the convention. In contrast, a normative pragmatic account involves asking, What obligations, responsibilities, and the like do theater personnel undertake just by setting up a line divider? Responsibilities are specifiable by considering patrons' reactive attitudes if theater personnel act as if setting up the line divider has no meaning. For example, if ticket-takers allow their friends to move to the front of the line before others already in line, then patrons can justifiably cry, "Unfair!" So by setting up a line divider, theater personnel change the world—the lobby—such that ticket-takers now have a responsibility to act in accord with norms of queuing such as not allowing some patrons to move to the front of the line. This reciprocal norm—reciprocal in that both theater personnel and patrons are obligated to act in accord with it now that setting up the line divider has brought it to bear in the situation—is the source of pragmatic force.

Setting up a line divider creates two practical reasons for patrons to queue up. First, patrons can reason that theater personnel would not have set up a line divider unless they planned to act in accord with norms of queuing. Patrons can calculate that theater personnel would not want to risk criticism for treating patrons unfairly or creating a chaotic situation where patrons, like theater personnel, also act as if the line divider is meaningless and push, shove, and trample others to get to the front of the line. Because the norms of queuing are reciprocal—because setting up the line divider changes the context such that both theater personnel and patrons are obligated to act in accord with norms of queuing, an obligation that all could plausibly disclaim if the line divider were not conspicuously out there in the lobby—setting up a line divider creates a second reason for patrons to queue up: To avoid getting called out for acting unfairly or forcibly removed from the theater, patrons can queue up. Normative pragmatic accounts of pragmatic force incorporate both speaker and addressee commitments, responsibilities, obligations, and so on because both are affected in interlocking ways by strategies the speaker deploys.

Of course our interest is not in advancing a theory of queuing but in advancing argumentation theory. Our pragmatic account of making argument$_1$s will proceed analogously to our pragmatic account of setting up a line divider. To preview the mode of analysis, consider for example a normative pragmatic account of why appealing to dignity authority pressures addressees to go along with what an authority says based on the authority's say-so (Goodwin 2001a). By appealing to dignity authority, a speaker undertakes responsibility for having made her best efforts to arrive at an accurate or fair judgment or decision, and puts her dignity on the line. So one reason for going along with the speaker's say-so that is created by appealing to dignity is: The authority would not risk her claim to dignity unless she were confident that her judgment is accurate, fair, and the like. A second reason is: To avoid risks of insulting the authority's dignity, addressees can go along with the authority's judgment.

Researchers have developed comparable accounts of the pragmatic force of appealing to expert authority (Goodwin 2011), demanding (Innocenti and Kathol 2018), and more. These accounts have explained how making argument$_1$s can serve some broader or "superordinate" (Jacobs 1989, p. 348) speech act such as proposing, accusing, or exhorting (Kauffeld 1998; Kauffeld and Innocenti 2018), and have shown that the uses of argument$_1$s are myriad and cannot be reduced to a single, primary function such as rational persuasion or resolution of a difference of opinion.

Our current interest is in advancing normative pragmatic theory by explaining the pragmatic force of making argument$_1$s. In what follows we analyze the pragmatic force of making argument$_1$s as we have analyzed the pragmatic force of a line divider in order to show some effects of putting argument$_1$s out in the world that have nothing to do with changing A's relationship to *c*. In analyzing the pragmatic force of a line divider, we did not provide any details about the design of the line divider such as its color, materials, or shape. Certainly those details matter; if the shape is not recognizable as a line divider, or if its color blends in with the surroundings rather than standing out, then it is more difficult to hold patrons responsible for recognizing and acting in accord with its meaning because they can plausibly say they did not know what it was or did not see it. Still, we explained how the basic normative structure of a line divider is designed to work by identifying obligations undertaken just by setting it up in the lobby. Likewise, we will analyze making argument$_1$s, without attending to the presentational design of the argument$_1$s, to explain what making argument$_1$s accomplishes prior to or instead of changing an audience's relationship to *c*. We proceed by analyzing cases of actual argumentation, because we hold that analyzing actual uses of argumentation ought to ground theory-building, and we assume that social actors self-regulate their communicative activities. While it is plausible to reduce uses of a line divider to a single, primary function or effect of influencing patrons to queue up—even though in other situations somebody may use a line divider to hang a "Caution! Slippery Floor" sign, display their jump-roping talents, sit on and rest their legs, fend off assailants, and more—we show the implausibility and undesirability of reducing the uses of argument$_1$s to a single, primary effect.

3 Case 1: 1848: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First Women's Rights Convention

The first women's rights convention met in Seneca Falls, where Elizabeth Cady Stanton lived, cared for her five children, and worked for reform movements including women's rights, temperance, and the abolition of slavery (Tetrault 2014). Organizers put a brief notice in the local newspaper that a women's rights convention would be held in a neighborhood church, and about 300 people attended, including at least 40 men (Flexner and Fitzpatrick 1996). Among the charges levelled against men in the famous "Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions" (2010b) that Stanton drafted and presented to the convention was a complaint about suffrage: "He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise."

Public opinion, even among some convention organizers (Wellman 2004), viewed women's suffrage as preposterous, however. Upon hearing Stanton read that complaint, co-organizer and Quaker minister Lucretia Mott reportedly exclaimed, "Oh Lizzie! If thou demands that, thou will make us ridiculous!" (qtd. in Lutz 1940). Mott was not alone; "there was a decided feeling against the resolution, not against its principle, but against its expediency—a fear that it was so radical that it would make the whole movement ridiculous and close the door to more rational reforms" (Lutz 1940, p. 49).

The fear of being ridiculed for endorsing women's suffrage was not unfounded. As one historian has put it, in the antebellum cultural milieu "the notion of political equality for women was so radical that for a long time it was virtually impossible even to imagine woman suffrage" (DuBois 1987, p. 839). Women were thought to be incapable of citizenship: their thought processes were dominated by emotions, not reason; their lives, confined to the domestic sphere, left them without the comprehensive vision needed for civic judgment; they didn't have the fortitude to withstand the rigors of partisan conflict; and they lacked the vocal and verbal dominance needed to participate in political debates (Isenberg 1998). Women's irrationality and seductiveness was invoked to preclude their participation in public advocacy (Welter 1966; Zaeske 1995). Their superior moral virtue, it was claimed, would be tainted by the rowdy conditions common at polling places (Blackwell 2004). Some stereotypes were propped up with religion. In his lecture on "Woman," for example, delivered in Philadelphia in 1849, Richard Henry Dana made the commonplace assertion that there is a divine, natural order, and woman's place in that order is in the home where she may exercise influence in the world "mediately [.. .] by permeating the masculine actor with the feminine of her own nature" (qtd. in Henry 1995, p. 13). Other stereotypes were sanctioned by science. In 1873 Clarke, a medical doctor, wrote about educating women in a book that went to 17 editions in 13 years (Cayleff 1992). He insisted that a girl ought not "work her brain over mathematics, botany, chemistry, German, and the like" because it is not possible to "safely divert blood from the reproductive apparatus to the head" (Clarke 1873, p. 126). Voting, in this view, would lead to sterility.

Within this cultural context, the Declaration of Sentiments was widely characterized as "'impracticable, absurd,…ridiculous…excessively silly…[and] unnatural'" (McMillen 2008, p. 99). Stanton herself seems to have been startled by the strength of the negative reaction; McMillan, in her comprehensive study of the Seneca Falls Convention, reports that Stanton

> later recorded in her memoir, "No words could express our astonishment on finding, a few days afterward, that what seemed to us so timely, so rational, and so sacred, should be a subject for sarcasm and ridicule to the entire press of the nation" (2008, p. 99).

Stanton remained steadfast, but others did not; "[t]he ridicule and pressure brought to bear on the signers of the Declaration of Sentiments was so great that one by one they asked to have their names removed" (Lutz 1940, p. 50).

The speech Stanton gave several times immediately after the convention can be seen as an attempt to shield the sentiments of the Declaration of Sentiments from "the weapons of the enemy, ridicule and holy horror" (Stanton 2010a). The speech is highly argumentative. We encourage you to read it. Stanton adopts a classical pattern of organization, ransacks history for evidence and refutes the most significant points against her, one by one. Her argument$_1$s demonstrated—i.e., displayed cogent reasons for believing—that women are not inferior to men, women have the same civil rights as men, and more. But as we analyzed not the color, materials, and shape of the line divider but the basic act of setting up a line divider, so we analyze not the presentational design of her particular argument$_1$s but her basic act of making argument$_1$s. So, for our purposes, less important than what Stanton's argument$_1$s were was the fact that *Elizabeth Cady Stanton was making them*.

Did Stanton use argument$_1$s to change A's relationship to *c*? Certainly Stanton's act of making argument$_1$s did not have a widespread effect of changing addressees' relationship to *c*; women's right to vote would not become the law of the land in the U.S. for another 72 years. Certainly her act of making argument$_1$s did not even have the widespread effect of changing addressees' relationship to *p*; for example, acceptance of the premise that men are not inherently superior to women did not gain widespread acceptance at the time and is still not universally accepted. We don't deny that by making argument$_1$s Stanton may have succeeded in

some instances in changing A's relationship to *c*, or even *p*. But if we simply explain her act of making argument$_1$s as an attempt to persuade an audience to believe the claim that women ought to have the right to vote, or to persuade an audience to acknowledge the adequacy of the premise that women are not inherently inferior to men, and leave it at that, then we overlook a significant use of argument$_1$s in this situation—a use that certainly succeeded in generating pragmatic force.

By standing up and putting *p* ∴ *c* s out there—by making argument$_1$s—Stanton was showing that she, a woman, was the kind of person who could make argument$_1$s. She used argument$_1$s to demonstrate—i.e., display, make visible, manifest, apparent—that she had reason as well as emotion, a vision of affairs beyond the domestic sphere, the fortitude to stand up for her views and the voice to defend them. So by making argument$_1$s Stanton changed the world, not by changing everybody's mind about woman suffrage, but by making reasons apparent. That basic effect of making argument$_1$s—making reasons apparent—had the further effect of generating pragmatic force. Making reasons apparent constrained addressees from saying with impunity that Stanton lacks reason, that she cannot see beyond the domestic sphere, that she is too weak to participate in public discussion and debate, and so on. Saying so would open addressees to criticism for willful blindness, ignorance, bigotry.

In this case and in any case, pragmatic force is not compulsion. Addressees could and did choose to risk criticism for willful blindness and the like, correctly calculating that in the circumstances the risk was not serious—that Stanton's act of making argument$_1$s would not revolutionize public opinion or, in other words, would not change A's relationship to *c*. Moreover, addressees could escape risks of criticism if they could plausibly say they did not recognize what Stanton was doing as making argument$_1$s—if her speech sounded more like story-telling or desultory reflecting, for example. So for Stanton's act of making argument$_1$s to have pragmatic force, Stanton had to live up to some norms of minimal cogency and clarity—to make apparent that she was reason-giving (rather than story-telling, reflecting, and so on).

Contemporary rhetorical scholarship calls the technique Stanton was employing *enactment*. In enactment, a claim is supported by the *activity* of making the claim.[3] Campbell and Jamieson have described enactment as a form "in which the speaker incarnates the argument, *is* the proof of the truth of what is said" (Campbell and Jamieson 1978, p. 9; see also; Campbell 1988; Crenshaw 1997; Lewis 2011). In Mendelson's words, the speaker "embodies" the claim being made; "the subject of one's discourse is rendered in the very form of that discourse" (1998, p. 38). Similarly, Palczewski has remarked, "the power of the (presentational) proof exceeds the (discursive) words" (2002, p. 7). Stanton was not alone among the early suffrage advocates in using enactment; many women defended their ability to be in public, to speak, and to reason by in fact being in public, speaking, and reasoning (e.g., Daughton 1995; Huxman 2000; Linkugel 1993).

When Stanton engaged in argumentative activities as a form of enactment, she was accomplishing a specific and forceful task:

1. In her speech, Stanton made many argument$_1$s in support of her claims for women's rights, and for suffrage in particular.
2. In light of the opposition the movement was already experiencing, it was unlikely that her audiences would seriously consider, much less be moved by, her demands for the vote.
3. Nevertheless, by making argument$_1$s, Stanton accomplished something: she showed to her audiences that she, a woman, was a person capable of making argument$_1$s.

4 Case 2: 1869–1875: "Women Already Voters" and Miss B

Step forward two decades. In the post-Civil War period, many suffrage activists expected women to be enfranchised alongside formerly enslaved men. When those expectations proved false, the women's movement fell into disarray, splintering into factions favoring different strategies. One of these, the National American Woman Suffrage Association, began in 1869 pursuing an approach sometimes called the "New Departure," which rested on an argument$_1$ that women *already* had the right to vote (Balkin 2005; DuBois 1987, 1995). The core argument$_1$ went like this:

*p*1. Women are citizens of the United States.
*p*2. Voting is a privilege or immunity of citizenship.
*p*3. The (new) 14th Amendment to the Constitution provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
c. Therefore, no state can abridge women's right to vote.

Based on this reasoning, women should not have to persuade anyone to *grant* them the right to vote. They already *had* the right, and should be able to claim the support of the courts if it were denied. Relying on this argument$_1$, hundreds

[3] The technique is thus the inverse of the performative contradiction, where the speaker's making of a claim serves to undermine it; it is the "I am alive" in contrast to the "I am dead."

of women across the country presented themselves at the polls, requested ballots, and in some cases managed to cast them (Ray 2007).

As Stillion Southard has observed about the "Women Already Voters" campaign, "it pressed the issue of woman suffrage into the privileged spaces of national politics and created the opportunity for women to enter these spaces and enact the citizenship rights they sought" (2011, p. 43). Victoria Woodhull made the core argument$_1$ when giving the first speech by a woman to a Congressional committee (DuBois 1987; Jones 2009). Susan B. Anthony and her lawyers made it to potential and actual jurors in two New York counties as part of a defense against charges of illegal voting (Richards 2007). And it was made before the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Minor v. Happersett*, brought to force local officials to register Virginia Minor as a voter (Ray and Richards 2007).

In all these cases, the argument$_1$ was met with summary dismissal. In the *Minor* case, for example, the state being sued didn't even bother to send a lawyer to the Supreme Court hearing, counting (correctly) on the Court to decide unanimously against the woman's claim. The lower court had written that the right of states to limit the suffrage to men

> cannot at this day be questioned. The (I may say) universal construction of the Constitution of the United States on this subject, and the almost universal practice of all of the States in reference to this subject, from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time, ought to be sufficient to prevent the necessity of an investigation of this subject now. There are certainly some questions that the courts of the country have a right to consider as settled, and that question I think is one of them ("Minor v. Happersett" 1873).

Note that the court here is not refuting the argument$_1$; it is scorning it as one that does not even deserve "investigation," since women's position is "settled" and "cannot…be questioned." Nowadays, we may have a hard time recovering the "off the wall" (Balkin 2005) character of the "Women Already Voters" reasoning, since we find the question settled on the other side. To get a sense of how bizarre women may have looked and sounded, imagine a 7-year-old showing up at a polling station and making a suitably modified version of the core argument$_1$ identified above.

The "Women Already Voters" argument$_1$ could hardly persuade audiences if it was unable even to get serious consideration. Nevertheless women persisted in making the argument$_1$, and that making did have pragmatic force. Consider the following interaction, reported in a contemporary woman's periodical (qtd. in Ray 2007, p. 12):

> *Miss B*. Here is my vote, sir, (handing in her ticket).
> *Judge*. What is the name?
> *Miss B*. Carrie S. Burnham.
> *Judge*. Where do you reside?
> *Miss B*. No. 1329 Vine street.
> The parties in charge of the window books promptly consulted their lists and found that these answers were correct.
> *Judge*. I am sorry, Miss Burnham, but I have instructions not to receive your vote.
> *Miss B*. Why not, sir? *I am a citizen. I pay taxes. I am governed, and I have a right to vote*.
> *Judge*. I cannot receive your vote.
> *Damon [Kilgore]*. What reason do you assign?
> *Judge*. This is not the place to argue the matter. I cannot take the vote.
> *Damon*. Let us not proceed too hastily. Allow me to present to your consideration the result of laborious research in this matter.
> Mr. Killgore then drew forth document after document, in order to convince the judge of the election that a lady had the right to vote. The decision of the judge could not be changed, and Mr. Killgore and his lady friend re-entered their carriage.

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Ray has described the act of attempted voting as "the appropriation of the cultural performance of a ritual for rhetorical ends" (2007, p. 3). But Miss B's performance is rejected, and it is at that point that she makes the (emphasized) core argument$_1$. What does this making *do*? It has

no chance of persuading—as the Judge points out, this is not the "place" for considering the argument$_1$. Nevertheless, making the argument$_1$ accomplishes important work. As Ray also points out, an out-of-place rhetorical performance like Miss B voting can be interpreted as a parody—as "playing vote" (a contemporary criticism quoted in Ray 2007, p. 17). It is so off-the-wall that it must be some sort of game, or practical joke, or, as we would say nowadays, "performance art." In that case, Miss B's attempt to vote would be taken as outrageous or silly. Making the argument$_1$, however, makes apparent that the performance is reasoned. Thus it demonstrates that Miss B is *serious*. She has a reason for thinking that she can vote—a reason that she shows to the Judge and other observers in making the argument$_1$.

This public appearance of reason can have an impact on the world. For example, it makes it harder for the Judge to just push Miss B out of the polling place. Her action appears reasoned; she isn't irrational or fooling with him, and thus deserves to be treated with at least a minimum of respect.[4] The public appearance can also have an impact on the speaker herself. Ray notes that "some women [attempting to vote] reported despondence and a motivating anger, whereas others expressed joy or renewed self-respect" (Ray 2007, p. 16). This reflexive effect of arguing on the arguer is what Gregg (1971) once called the "ego-function of rhetoric." What is involved, Gregg explains, is not so much "self-persuasion" about the particular "claims or the sense and probity of appeals and arguments," but instead *self-constitution*: "establishing, defining, and affirming one's self-hood as one engages in a rhetorical act" (p. 74). By presenting themselves at the polls, and making clear that they did so with reason, women like Miss B enacted their identity as citizens, took ownership of that identity, and were thereby empowered to continue advocating.

Here again we find women engaging in argumentative activities to accomplish specific and forceful work:

1. Women like Miss B in the "Women Already Voters" movement made an argument$_1$ that the U.S. Constitution required recognition of women's right to vote.
2. In light of long-established precedent and hostile public opinion, it was unlikely that their audiences would seriously consider, much less be moved by, that argument$_1$.
3. Nevertheless, by making that argument$_1$, the women accomplished something: they showed to their audiences—and to themselves—that their attempts to vote were reasoned; that they were not playing, but serious.

[4] It should be noticed that Damon, stepping in to speak for his companion, threatens to render her performance farcical or outrageous. His attempt to extend the argument$_1$ seems pointless bickering that is just holding up the queue. Or in short: the gentleman with his "laborious research" doth argue *too much*.

5 Conclusion

Women continued to make argument$_1$s for suffrage, and their performances slowly made it difficult to repeat with impunity the old stereotypes about their incapacities. In fact, eventually the tables turned and their adversaries became the objects of ridicule. Responding to a 1915 *New York Times* editorial opposing woman suffrage, one letter-writer described it as

> about the most amusing piece of journalism I have read in some time. Of course your so-called arguments are musty with age, and may nearly all be found in the joke books of twenty years ago, but that a single mind should remember them all, and string them together so consecutively, and then attempt to palm them off as new productions, constitutes the real humor of the article in question (Beardsley 1915).

This inversion took two generations to accomplish, however. The case studies of Stanton and Miss B show that in the immediate context

1. when S makes an argument$_1$—that is, makes $p \therefore c$ apparent—
2. even though her making is unlikely to have any effect on A's relationship to c
3. nevertheless, her making can do work that's important for the cause she is advocating.

In each case, S was inducing A to make inferences. But the inferences her argument$_1$-making justified were not inferences from p, the premise of her argument$_1$, to c, her asserted conclusion. Instead, by making an argument$_1$, S created and made available to A a new premise: *the fact that she had made an argument$_1$*. And based on this new premise, A could then make a pragmatic inference,[5] drawing important conclusions about S: that S was a person capable of making argument$_1$s, and that her actions, however strange they might seem, were for reasons.

The existence of these case studies presents a challenge to current functionalist theories of argumentation. In each

[5] We use "pragmatic inference" in the technical sense established in pragmatics to refer to the "'ampliative' inferences" (Korta and Perry 2015) that are drawn from the fact that someone said something, to someone, in some circumstances. It is a commonplace that what a speaker means goes beyond the meaning of what she says. That extra (or sometimes even unrelated) meaning an auditor must figure out through some inferential process. These inferences are "pragmatic inferences" because they start from what the speaker has *done*. For example, from the fact that the President takes the Attorney General aside and says, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this [investigation] go," a pragmatic inference can be drawn that President is ordering the AG to stop the investigation.

of these cases, S appears to have been doing a workmanlike job, i.e., engaging in argumentative activities that a pragmatic theory of argumentation should evaluate as *good*. Current functionalist theories direct us to locate that goodness in the way that S is changing A's relationship to *c*—in the way she is rationally persuading A to accept *c*, inducing A to accept *c* as a standpoint, or any of the other asserted functions. But in these two cases, the goodness of S's argumentative activities is unrelated to the exact *p* ∴ *c* she was making apparent. Remember, we didn't even tell you what Stanton's argument$_1$s were—we just assured you that they were in fact argument$_1$s. So we have here two cases of good argumentative activities that aren't good according to functionalist theories. Indeed, some functionalists might have to say they were *bad*, since in the circumstances it was unreasonable to expect A to change his relationship to *c*.

How might a functionalist reply to this criticism? One possibility is to propose that both Stanton and Miss B were implicitly targeting other, more tractable, audiences, when they directly addressed obdurate ones. Then a functionalist could say that the argument$_1$s that got made could plausibly affect the relationship of these implied audiences to the conclusions the speakers were arguing for. We certainly agree that argumentative activities commonly have multiple goals, both short- and long-term; that is a basic assumption in rhetorical studies. Early suffrage advocates were undoubtedly looking forward to shifting public opinion in the long run and claiming recognition from an audience of posterity. But it is hard to build a robustly pragmatic theory of argumentation around an imagined audience. The aim of pragmatic theories is to gain better understandings of argument$_1$s by embedding them in the immediate context of the argument$_2$s in which they occur. Even Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" or Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream"—speeches that certainly approach the summit of universal truth and beauty—were first designed to address local circumstances. Explaining how messages are designed to achieve local effects in difficult situations orients researchers toward myriad uses of argument$_1$s and norms that making argument$_1$s and other strategies bring to bear in situations. Invoking more diffuse contexts will not give the same sort of traction for theory-building. The vexed history of Perelman's "universal audience" provides a vivid example of this.

Another line of defense a functionalist might offer would be to dismiss our two cases studies as aberrant, atypical, rare. But, on the contrary and unfortunately, such cases are common. What Dimock has called a "protest style of argument" thrives whenever "a person or group finds itself in a position where it is being ignored or undermined by the dominant views of society" (2010, p. 448). Many individuals and groups advocating causes outside the mainstream need to demonstrate that they aren't ridiculous in order to gain a voice in the public sphere and be taken seriously. Making argument$_1$s is one durable strategy for accomplishing this.

Even in ordinary interactions, argumentative activities often serve primarily to form a speaker's identity, not an audience's beliefs or standpoints. Through arguing we often figure out who we are, express that identity in public, and claim respect from others; this has been confirmed in studies across the entire range of the interdisciplinary endeavor of argumentation theory. Grounding his approach in political theory, Asen (2005) put forward identity formation as one of the key tasks of argumentation in the contemporary, pluralistic, public sphere. Based on qualitative analysis of an argumentative interaction among three people who already agree, Doury (2012) similarly uncovered identity creation as a key aim. In making an argument$_1$ the arguer can openly take a stand for her conclusion and express her reasoning. Such a "realization [that is, making-real] of one's own convictions as well as the justification of them, amount to constructing an identity for oneself," Doury comments. "A person defines oneself by one's beliefs, by the reasons one has for those beliefs, by the fact that one takes the responsibility of expressing those beliefs and by the way one chooses to verbalize them, among others" (p. 109). Scott Jacobs's qualitative study of fundamentalist preachers on a university campus established a parallel conclusion: arguing can be "not so much audience-directed as it is self-directed," even when—or perhaps especially when—the speaker is performing a socially disapproved role (van Eemeren et al. 1993, p. 157; Jacobs 1982). Hample and Irion's (2015) recent quantitative analysis confirms that identity display is a motive for engaging in face-to-face arguing that is well recognized by ordinary arguers. Simply announcing a commitment may not be enough to project a desired identity to an interlocutor, even when he agrees with it; providing reasons for the view—i.e., making argument$_1$s—adds credibility and "give[s] grounding and texture to the disclosure, to help define the other's impression" (p. 392). Finally, it's worth returning to the foundational work of philosopher Johnstone, Jr., who kept trying to get us to notice that "a person who chooses argument does in fact choose himself" (Johnstone 1963, p. 35, 1967 and; see also; Goodwin 2007b).

One way to rebuild a functionalist theory of argumentation in the face of the counter-evidence presented in this paper would be to pull the functional focus back from changing A's relationship to *c* to the task we have been exploring here: S's making a *p* ∴ *c* apparent. Such a refocusing would have a key advantage for the functional theorist. We have elsewhere critiqued functionalist theories for not defending why the specific function each asserts is *the* function of argumentation, with all other argumentative uses and purposes (and all other theorists' asserted functions) merely parasitic on it (Goodwin 2007a). Taking the function of argumentation to be making reasons apparent can meet this challenge.

First, that function aligns better with our immediate experience of argumentative activities, and so is a better candidate for being *the* function going on there. The ways we speak about arguing are strongly oriented to *visibility*. In English the natural thing to say when one is done arguing is "I've shown you;" the desired response is "I see." We inherit a technical vocabulary from classical languages with fossilized traces of the same emphasis: e.g., "demonstrate" from the Latin *monstrare* and "apodictic" from the Greek *deiknumi*, both meaning "to show, point out." Second, all the other functions currently asserted by theorists are parasitic on the more basic function of making reasons apparent. To affect an auditor's relationship to *c* (to persuade them that *c*, to induce them to alter their standpoint about *c*, etc.) a speaker first has to make a reason *for c* apparent. It is not possible to change A's relationship *to c* without making a reason apparent, although it is possible (as the two cases have shown) for S to make a reason apparent without trying to change A's relationship to *c*. Making reasons apparent is a task pragmatically necessary for any audience effect. Therefore, if there is a single, primary function of argumentation, making reasons apparent is more likely it.

Do we *want* to take making reasons apparent to be the primary function of argumentation? We don't see why we would. If making reasons apparent is indeed the function of argumentation, it is going to be hard to derive substantial norms from it. It is too thin. What conditions need to be in place for making reasons apparent to get its job done? The leading candidates might be:

1. What is made apparent has to be a *reason*. Note that it doesn't have to be a very *good* reason; it just has to be a *p* ∴ *c* unit: a premise, in some sort of support relationship with a claim/conclusion. Interestingly, this suggests that argumentative activities rely on a conception of "∴" —i.e., that a pragmatic theory of argumentation needs support from a theory of reasons, such as (perhaps) informal logic may provide (Hansen 2012; Pinto 2009).
2. The reason has to be *made apparent*. This suggests a norm of clarity in making argument$_1$s: S is responsible for making manifest in the world the fact *that p* is a reason for *c*.

In our experience, both of these norms are indeed important in teaching, where we find ourselves frequently telling our students to make argument$_1$s (not tell stories) and to use lots of indicator words to make the structure of their argument$_1$s clear. However, these two items hardly exhaust the norms needed to capture the goodness of argument$_1$s, much less argument$_2$s—i.e., the norms needed for a complete pragmatic theory of argumentation. In particular, since A, the audience of the argumentative activity, isn't directly implicated in this function of making reasons apparent, it is unlikely that this function will provide a basis for audience-regarding norms like S's responsibility to treat A fairly or to respond to A's doubts and objections.

If it seems strained or unimpressive to talk about *making a reason apparent* as the "function of argumentation" why not drop the function talk and just say that to make an argument$_1$ for *c*, a speaker has to make a reason *for c* apparent? Making a reason apparent is what making an argument$_1$ *is* (Jacobs 2000; O'Keefe 1982; Pinto 2010). Figure 3 is not a picture of a person performing the function of argumentation; it is a picture of a person making an argument$_1$.

Adopting this approach, argumentation theories with a pragmatic bent remain interested in what people can do individually and collectively by making argument$_1$s. But instead of anointing one or more of these doings as *functions*, all such modes of action are embraced as *uses*. The uses are many and sometimes surprising; in addition to the two documented here, argument$_1$s can be used to open (not resolve) issues (Asen 2005; Goodwin 2002), to construct (not defend) standpoints (Asen 2005; Doury 2012), to create (not build on) premises (Goodwin 2005), and to induce audiences to pay attention to any of this at all (Kauffeld 1998).

Therefore, and in conclusion, we hold that the central question for theory then becomes: why do these uses have pragmatic *force*? Why is it reasonable to expect that making an argument$_1$, together with some additional communicative activity, will reliably have a specific effect, especially in an interaction where a speaker and auditor are already disagreeing? Pragmatic theories of argumentation are responsible for understanding argumentative activities in all their cunning, their richness and diversity, and especially for explaining how they *work*. The normative pragmatic approach to argumentation theory has been doing just that.

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Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest Jean Goodwin declares that she has no conflict of interest. Beth Innocenti declares that she has no conflict of interest.

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