In F.H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen (Eds.), Argumentation in Actual Practice (pp. 157-172). John Benjamins: 2019.

CHAPTER 9

Radically reframing the climate debate

The rhetorical strategies of *The Hartwell Paper*

Jean Goodwin
North Carolina State University, USA

Given that there are innumerable issues of potential public concern at multiple scales, and multiple ways forward on each of them, we would expect publicly defended standpoints to be as abundant as the stars in the sky. But that is not our ordinary experience of civic deliberations. Instead, the standpoints that appear in public space seem to be clustered into a relatively limited number of constellations. Take climate change as an example (Table 1). We find some advocates arguing for, others against the Kyoto Protocol, the international regime which committed nations to CO2 emission reduction targets. Since the existence of anthropogenic global warming (AGW) provides key support for the Kyoto Protocol, it is not surprising to find the same advocates dividing the same way on that issue as well. And the division of the advocates on the importance of environmental issues generally is also plausible. But things become a bit more mysterious when we consider nuclear power and fracking. Although these lower/no-CO2 technologies could be defended as approaches for meeting emission targets, we know that pro-Kyoto/AGW-believer advocates also tend to reject both. Indeed, the constellations extend to environmental issues like GMOs that have little to do with climate change, and even to issues like abortion that have little to do with the environment.

Here we see the vast space of potential disagreements being contracted down to a limited number of mega-conflicts between constellations of standpoints (or party platforms, or ideologies, or cap-d hegemonic Discourses). Note that the focus here is only on standpoints "externalized" – "expressed and brought into confrontation with one another" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p. 11) – in the public sphere. A much broader range of political philosophies are elaborated in technical spheres. Rodrigues, Lewiński and Uzelgun (2019) usefully trace multiple basic philosophies ranging from a radical eco-centrism through sustainable development to a sort of a hyper-anthropocentrism. These

https://doi.org/10.1075/aic.17.09goo

Table 1. Constellations of standpoints in climate controversies

Constellation L	Constellation R
The Kyoto Protocol is good!	The Kyoto Protocol is bad!
AGW is real and serious – scientists agree.	AGW is not real and/or not serious and/or scientists do not agree.
Environmental issues should be a top priority.	Environmental issues should not be a top priority.
No nukes.	Nuclear power is not bad, and is maybe even good.
Fracking is bad.	Fracking is not bad, and is maybe even good.
Say no to GMOs.	GMOs are safe and effective.
Abortion should be legal (mostly).	Abortion should be illegal (mostly).

perspectives, often emerging from academic debates, are coupled with discussions within what Rodrigues et al. call the "high-level policy" community. Nevertheless, as they note the general public debate is still dominated by a dichotomy of standpoints, "chiefly those between the oil industry – as well as fossil fuel-friendly climate change skeptics – and the climate change scientists and activists" (p. 17).

Individuals also have mixed up "internal" attitudes; a person may be an evangelical Christian, for example, opposing abortion but believing that action on climate change is an important part of creation care. Recent polling has suggested that "straight-line liberal or conservative attitudes" are increasing, with more Americans holding ideologically uniform views "across a range of issues, from homosexuality and immigration to foreign policy, the environment, economic policy and the role of government" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 19). This phenomenon, known as sorting, does not imply an increase in extremism or polarization; instead, it has to do with consistency of beliefs among party members and sympathizers. But even with increased sorting only 20% of Americans are thoroughly ideologically consistent in their views, on either side; 40% hold liberal and conservative views in equal measure, and the remaining 40% lean one way but share some views with the "other side."

What the freezing of positions into opposed constellations does most track is increased polarization among the elites responsible for converting private views into public standpoints. The Pew study cited above notes that "there is now no overlap between the two parties" in the US Congress – "every Republican senator and representative was more conservative than the most conservative Democrat (or, putting it another way, every Democrat was more liberal than the most liberal Republican)" (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 27). Media elites also find it useful to frame all climate issues – and not just debates over the existence of global

warming – as instances of the same pro/con debate (e.g., Goodwin, 2019). Thus while the constellations of expressed standpoints do not reflect the complexity of available positions or the jumble of ordinary views, they do reflect the preferences of the media and opinion leaders.

Locking down constellations of standpoints can have some positive impacts on the quality of public deliberations. It promotes the emergence and intensive development of robust standardized arguments (*topoi*, in one meaning of that term) through iterated pro/con dilogues on a determinate set of issues. It incentivizes advocates to become highly skilled at making those arguments. It allows ordinary folk to proceed efficiently, since a judgment on one standpoint permits them to inherit a large set of additional standpoints with no further cognitive labour. And it enables them to be equally efficient at social categorization, for if you're not with me, you're against me.

The negative impacts of restricting open disagreements are equally apparent. Standpoint constellations lock in dilogues, suppressing potential argumentative polylogues (Aakhus & Lewiński, 2016; Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014) that might allow a broader range of arguments to get made and considered. Mainstream advocates participating in the set-piece dilogues may face few unexpected challenges and can get lazy. Advocates supporting standpoints between or beyond existing constellations are locked out of the process. And tribal sorting may not over the long term provide a stable social base for civic deliberations.

Arguers who want public discourse to shift from dilogue to polylogue thus face practical challenges in breaking through existing constellations. To continue the example above: consider the situation of advocates who want to demand action on climate change and environmental issues generally, while also arguing against the Kyoto Protocol and for nuclear power and fracking. They are likely to be seen as trojan horses by proponents of Constellation R, sneaking climate regulations through the opening provided by nuclear power; and as traitors by proponents of Constellation L, paying lip service to the environment while giving industry everything it wants. Neither L or R advocates may be willing to engage, and so a debate that goes beyond L v. R – a polylogue – may simply never get going.

In this paper, I propose to advance our understanding of the means non-constellated arguers have for gaining a hearing. This essay thus contributes to the growing body of research on the work it takes to get exchanges of arguments going, issuing especially from scholars adopting a normative pragmatic approach. An argumentative transaction is an achievement; arguers have to earn consideration for their views (Kauffeld, 1998; Innocenti Manolescu, 2007), make issues to be worth arguing (Goodwin, 2000), impose responsibilities to produce arguments (Kauffeld, 1998) and regulate the argumentative process as it goes along (Innocenti, 2011). Throughout the transaction, arguers must work is to overcome

expectable and often legitimate sources of resistance. As Fabio Paglieri has been pointing out (2009, 2013, 2017; Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2010) there are plenty of reasons *not* to start making arguments: it can confuse matters, escalate conflicts and damage reputations. It can waste time. It can prove you wrong. To this list, I now add inertia: the tendency of arguers to resist engaging arguments that jump out of well-worn tracks. What can arguers who want to press a novel perspective do to overcome this inertia?

I proceed through a case study of a presumably competent attempt to open a polylogue. The *Hartwell Paper* (Prins et al., 2010) was produced when two groups of experienced arguers joined to call for (in the words of the subtitle) "a new direction for climate policy after the crash of 2009" (Figure 1). In the US, activists Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus had been advocating a new way forward on environmental problems since their 2004 whitepaper, *The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World*. Their think tank, the Breakthrough Institute, promoted policy approaches that integrated

Figure 1. The front page of The Hartwell Paper

economic development and technological innovation with environmental protection. By 2008, Breakthrough's roster included Roger Pielke, Jr., another American proponent of new ways of thinking about climate change. In the UK, science studies scholars Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner had joined to warn against the unintended consequences of the Kyoto approach in their *The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy* (2007). They published a similarly revisionary whitepaper in 2009, *How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course*, adding social scientists Mike Hulme (UK) and Nico Stehr (Germany) to the author group, as well as Pielke and Dan Sarewitz, another American critical of mainstream approaches to climate policy and science.

The Hartwell Paper was the final step bringing together the transatlantic renegades. Organized by Prins, the meeting that produced the *Paper* included Rayner, Nordhaus, Shellenberger, Pielke, Hulme, Stehr, Sarewitz and six other academic or policy professionals. They described themselves as follows:

> The authors of this paper are an eclectic group of academics, analysts and energy policy advocates without any common political or professional affiliation. We are citizens from a small number of OECD countries – UK, USA, Germany, Japan, Finland, Canada – each of us working through heterogeneous sets of scholarly, scientific, academic, industrial and policy networks. We share a common concern that the current framing of climate change and climate policy has 'boxed us in'. (pp. 7–8)

As a group, the authors had a substantial track record in trying to articulate new approaches to the climate debate, and to environmental issues generally (Nisbet, 2014). They met in retreat in February, 2010 at the eponymous Hartwell House, an estate converted into a hotel; the *Paper* was issued a few months later.

The immediate occasion for their meeting was the disaster of COP 15, the Copenhagen Summit, in December, 2009. The Summit had been supposed to produce a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol, due to expire in 2012. Instead, beyond-last-minute, behind-the-scenes negotiations produced nothing more than a weak set of non-binding recommendations that were non-unanimously "taken note of." Contributing to the procedural and substantive catastrophe were: the refusal of a coalition of developing nations to discuss restrictions on their economic growth; demands from island states for immediate, deep emission cuts and recompense for climate injuries; and a new US president unable to live up to his campaign promises but (as always) willing to throw the country's weight around. The entire drama played out against the background of the "Climategate" emails, which two weeks before had revealed some unsavoury-looking sausage-making among leading climate scientists.

In its Parts II and III – approximately 85% of the text – the authors of *The Hartwell Paper* lay out the principles of and policy levers for a new approach

to climate change. Put simply, they recommend dropping the Kyoto Protocol's emphasis on emission caps and instead pursuing broadly popular goals like reducing black carbon, improving energy efficiency, achieving energy equity and taxing emissions to support research into new technologies. These measures (say the authors) achieve modest gains in decarbonization while simultaneously building coalitions for further action. The authors in these two parts are clearly making a proposal: putting forth their standpoints for serious consideration while undertaking a burden of proof to answer reasonable doubts and objections against them. Explicitly labelled arguments get made and refuted, and further exchanges are invited; the *Paper* closes by positioning itself "as a first, not as a last word" on its approach (p. 36).

All this is a customary argumentative activity, already well understood by argumentation theorists (especially Kauffeld, 1998). But the authors insist that not everything they are doing is so traditional. The *Paper* openly presents itself "radical" – a word used 16 times over 30 pages, including in the titles of both Parts II and III ("Radical Reframing," "Radical Departure") and in the final summary calling for "a radical rethinking and then a reordering of the climate policy agenda" (p. 36). The *Paper* similarly portrays itself as "invert[ing] the conventional wisdom" on the relationship of science to policy, claiming that scientific certainty actually prevents policy action, while acknowledging the uncertain and unknown will promote improved deliberations (p. 19). In another "inversion," the *Paper* announces a preference for short-term goals like energy equity over long-term goals like reduction in CO2 emissions (p. 10, 13). There can be, it proclaims, no "single, governing, coherent and enforceable thing called 'climate policy'" (p. 7); in a zen-like turn, the climate policy proposed by *The Hartwell Paper* is no climate policy at all.

The authors of *The Hartwell Paper* thus face a pressing challenge. How can they secure the minimum of attention necessary for there to be an audience for their upside-down no-policy policy? – how can they get people even to read Parts II and III, much less to engage them argumentatively? Carbon taxes, but with no mention of CO2 emissions? Fight climate change, but promote increased energy use among the world's poorest 1.5 billion people? That novel cluster of standpoints is likely to be dismissed out of hand by advocates in the familiar L/R, pro/con dilogue in Table 1. Indeed, the *Hartwell* authors acknowledge this challenge, and in particular the challenge of breaking open the constellation of standpoints typical of those who support climate action. As they admit in the first paragraph of the Executive Summary, "the currently dominant approach [to climate policy] has acquired immense political momentum because of the quantities of political capital sunk into it" (p. 5). But new approaches are vital, since "the previous… model has dangerously narrowed our option space for thinking seriously and realistically

about energy and environmental policies" (p. 8). What can be done to oppose the "momentum" and broaden the "space"? The authors' response to this challenge can give us indications about how advocates in general can force open constellations of standpoints, making room for argumentative polylogues.

Part I of the *Hartwell Paper* (pp. 1–10) presumably provides the inducement for readers to go on to the remainder of the document, so I here examine the discursive work accomplished in that Part (plus the Executive Summary), and in particular in its first paragraph:

> [1] One year ago, few would have guessed that by the spring of 2010 climate policy would be in such public disarray. [2] Two watersheds were crossed during the last months of 2009, one political and one scientific. [3] The narratives and assumptions upon which major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments had relied until that moment in shaping and pushing international climate policy towards becoming global climate policy have been undermined. [4] The course that climate policy has been pursuing for more than a decade is no longer sustainable – climate policy must find a new way forward. [5] And that presents us with an immense opportunity to set climate policy free to fly at last. [6] The principal motivation and purpose of this paper is to explain and to advance this opportunity. (p. 6)

Let us go through this paragraph sentence by sentence, seeing how it makes room for the *Paper's* "inverted" proposals.

The paragraph opens with a declaration of a fact it takes to be "public" – obvious to all – namely that climate policy is in "disarray" [1]. The emphasis on the *apparentness* of the inadequacy of the Kyoto regime and its accompanying science reoccurs throughout Part I; the authors portray themselves as simply "observing" what "seems inescapable" (p. 8), "plain" (p. 5), "shown" (p. 7) and "discernable" (p. 10). What is euphemistically termed "disarray" in the opening sentence is elsewhere referred to more bluntly as a "crash," starting on the cover page in the Paper's subtitle. A crash is a conspicuous, attention-drawing event; hearing an explosive bang and seeing a mass of twisted steel, one doesn't need to weigh considerations about what just happened. One sees: the car has crashed.

At this point, with one policy-car crashed, the authors might be expected to reveal their new model and start arguing for its comparative advantages over the previous one in carrying us forward. But instead of taking the *inferential* step from the evidence of a crash to a disputable conclusion about the vehicle's inadequacy, the *Paper* continues the *temporal* ordering of indisputable facts started in the first sentence's opening reference to "one year ago" [1]. In the time since then, "two watersheds were crossed" [2]. The following paragraphs elaborate these watershed-crossings in brief narratives. The first watershed "was crossed on 18th December, a day which marked the confusing and disjointed ending to the climate

conference in Copenhagen" (p. 6). Speaking in the past perfect tense to suggest that these events have long been settled, the authors state that "no agreements of any consequence" came out of Copenhagen, and indeed "the very process of multilateral diplomacy through large set-piece conferences had been called into question." The second watershed "was crossed on 17th November" (p. 6), with the release of the Climategate emails. Here the narrative is told in past and present progressive tenses, emphasizing a process of increasing doubts about the integrity of climate science and the IPCC reports which summarize it. In neither narrative are there any indicators that anyone would disagree. Indeed, the whole progression over the period has been from more to less disagreement: "we begin," the authors later explain, by "observing what was once controversial but which now seems inescapable: for progress to occur on climate policy, we must reframe the issue in a fundamental way: not simply in various procedural details" (p. 8).

The conspicuousness of the crash has thus dragged into the light what is ordinarily hidden: "the narratives and assumptions upon which major…governments had relied until that moment in shaping and pushing international climate policy" [3]. At issue are not the surface details of the policy – for example, the year to be selected as a baseline, the exact emission targets for each nation or the method of calculating them. Instead, "'problem is epistemological'" (p. 7); the "error…fundamental" (p.15). The general principles on which climate policy is built have been "undermined" [3]. What is needed then is not so much new policy, as a new "framing," to use the word the *Paper* deploys on average more than once per page.

For example: in the old framing, climate policy aimed to mitigate the CO2 emissions which drive climate change. Wrong. Writing with repetitions that emphasize the certainty of their statement, the authors state "there is no evidence that, despite vast investment of time, effort and money, the 'Kyoto' type approach has produced any discernable acceleration of decarbonisation whatsoever: not anywhere; not in any region" (p. 10). So "it is now plain that it is not possible to have a 'climate policy' that has emissions reductions as the all encompassing goal" (p. 5). Instead, the "object of emissions reduction [will be achieved indirectly] via other goals, riding with other constituencies and gathering other benefits" (p. 9).

Or again: in the old framing, climate policy aimed to tackle whatever caused or was caused by climate change. And that means everything – "the loss of biodiversity, the gross inequity in patterns of development, degradation of tropical forests, trade restrictions, violation of the rights of indigenous peoples, intellectual property rights. The list seemed to grow by the month" (p. 7) – to everyone, "economists,… theologians,… activists and… politicians of different stripes, arrayed on every side of the issue" (p. 8). The result: "the carbon issue has been overloaded with the baggage of other framings and agendas" (p. 9). Bad idea. Instead, climate policy must be local, partial, and near-term – "modest" (p. 8, 34). Avoiding "a

grand and comprehensive governance regime" is not a matter of settling for less; "we are aware that in a complex world, the solutions we propose are not practically perfect but rather clumsy: that is our intent and we build this awareness into our approach" (p. 9).

Or again: in the old framing, the certainty of climate science provides the basis for climate policy. No; that is a "flawed assumption" – a "mis-framing" (p. 17). Instead, it's clear that it is precisely the uncertainties of the science that provide the grounds for policies that will be robust against a large range of eventualities.

Academic theories of framing were diverse even when Scheufele (1999) reviewed one corner of the vast literature twenty years ago. The *Hartwell Paper* here deploys the concept not in any technical sense, but in order to encourage what Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca termed a dissociation between old and new "concepts" of climate policy (1969, § 89 et seq.). As Rodrigues et al. explain in their analysis of another whitepaper in the ecopragmatist tradition:

> Dissociation – the counterpart of association – is an argumentative technique in which a unitary term (e.g., "love") is split into two separate terms, one of which is highly valued (term II: real love: a profound spiritual attraction), while the other one dismissed (term I: apparent love: merely physical attraction. One can thus be both for and against love – for real love, but against apparent love, etc.
>
> (2019, p. 23)

Talk of "reframing" encourages the audience to reach beyond the details of policy (e.g., exact emissions reduction targets) to the "policy regimes, frameworks, models, structures, approaches" that hold those details together (e.g., the Kyoto approach); and then beyond the regimes to the even deeper "organising principle[s],… narratives and assumptions" (p. 5, 6) on which they are based. In general, dissociations often proceed by splitting the "real" concept from the merely "apparent" one. In *The Hartwell Paper*, by contrast, the dissociation performs what Perelman termed a "reversal" of this ordinary appearance/reality distinction (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, § 92). Instead of urging readers to abandon policies that seem on the surface attractive but are in a deeper way ineffective, the authors of *The Hartwell Paper* want readers to acknowledge the apparent policy crash and abandon the deeper principles which brought it about. The real policy needs to produce immediate, visible positive results.

It is at this point that the authors of *The Hartwell Paper* offer their first argument – their first step from a premise to a conclusion. Because "the course that climate policy has been pursuing for more than a decade is no longer sustainable [therefore] climate policy must find a new way forward" [4]. The crash is less a dire emergency than an opening, a *kairos*: "an immense opportunity to set climate policy to fly free at last" [5]. And thus the purpose of the rest of the *Paper*: "to explain and to advance this opportunity" [6].

In summary: The opening section of *The Hartwell Paper* needs to earn its audience's attention to the upside-down proposal it offers in later section, one that breaks the standard constellations of standpoints on climate issues and thus opens the possibility for a polylogical policy deliberations. The authors proceed by a strategy of "pointing out," drawing readers' attention to circumstances that are plain and undisputable. They assert narratives that do not allow possibilities of disagreement. These matters, apparent to all, demand a dissociation between and old and a new conception of climate policy.

In other words, the authors proceed to open the way to argument over their proposals through non-argumentative discourse. Why is this strategy significant? Consider again the situation the authors face. The ultimate goal of all advocates on climate issues is to take any actions needed to save the planet (Figure 2). Since arguing about appropriate responses provides opportunities for justifying policies (normatively), improving them (epistemically), and building support for them (pragmatically), a debate over climate policy is likely worth the time and effort involved. There is a room for argument before the room for action. *The Hartwell Paper* is now moving readers up another level, to examine the framing (assumptions, basic perspectives) underlying the debate, as a way to get their novel proposals heard in the over-constellated policy debate. The contours of the best policy framing, and the need for re-framing at all, could be debated – could be debated just as heatedly as the debate about climate policy. And why stop there? Arguers could go another level "meta-" and debate whether *The Hartwell Paper* has deployed the correct conception of "framing." But all that meta-debate would not seem to be getting us nearer to saving the planet. It would not significantly improve our situation, normatively, epistemically or pragmatically. At some point, there is no more room for meta-argument.



Figure 2. Rooms for action, for argument, and for non-argument

As Sally Jackson (2008) has noted, prudent management of probative responsibilities is key for both individual success and good collective outcomes in civic controversies (2008). In principle, every statement can be called out – every debate can ramify into indefinite levels of "meta" – debates over the right way to proceed in the debate, the right way to proceed in the meta$_1$-debate, the right way to proceed in the meta$_2$-debate, and so on. But some kettles of fish are not worth opening. In particular, meta-debate "does not, after all, really help to settle any of the individual controversies in which it emerges" (p. 228). Advocates therefore occasionally need strategies for establishing the conditions for argument that are not themselves argumentative – that don't invite disagreement and further production of reasons. The authors of *The Hartwell Paper* designed their text to make space for an argumentative polylogue over climate policy. But they designed it in way that *didn't* take on argumentative responsibilities for their re-framing. If challenged to defend the ruin of prior policies, they have left themselves room to refuse to respond.

In addition to "pointing-out," narrative and dissociation, the opening section of *The Hartwell Paper* includes two further strategies of non-argument. One is a strong *movement* metaphor, albeit somewhat mixed: after passing over "watersheds," climate policy has "crashed." It can no longer main its "course" and must "find a new way forward" – a new approach that will "set [it] free to fly at last." This metaphoric cluster is also hinted at in the subtitle of the paper, with its call for a "new direction for climate policy." In these uses, the metaphor suggests a sense of momentum, carrying the reader away from an orientation which has proved inadequate towards a more adequate perspective. But in the final paragraphs of Part I of *The Hartwell Paper*, the *movement* metaphor becomes instead a vehicle for imaginatively reconstructing the entire framework for climate policy. Here is the extended analogy:

> If one seeks long-lasting impact, the best line of approach may not be head-on. "Lose the object and draw nigh obliquely" is a dictum attributed to the famous eighteenth century English landscape gardener Lancelot "Capability" Brown. Brown's designs framed the stately home at the entrance, but only briefly. After allowing the visitor a glimpse of his destination, the driveway would veer away to pass circuitously and delightfully through woodland vistas, through broad meadows with carefully staged apercus of waterfalls and temples, across imposing bridges spanning dammed streams and lakes, before delivering the visitor in a relaxed and amused frame of mind, unexpectedly, right in front of the house. That displays a subtle skill which has manifest political value: the capacity to deliver an ambitious objective harmoniously. "Capability" Brown might be a useful tutor for designers of climate policies. (p. 9)

Policy whitepapers are utilitarian documents, produced (and forgotten) quickly. So the grace and craftsmanship of this passage are even more striking. There is more than just vivid description going on here. Consider the long quasi-periodic sentence in the middle of the paragraph. Like a garden by "Capability" Brown, it wanders through some elegant phrases before depositing the reader, in a relaxed and amused frame of mind, unexpectedly, at the main point. This is *The Hartwell Paper*'s final technique of non-argument: the sentence and indeed the entire, digressive passage on landscape design verbally enacts (Leff, 2003) the perspective of one approaching an English country house – the same perspective the authors invite readers to take on climate policy.

This linking of the design of climate policy to the design of English landscape gardens is referred to repeatedly in the rest of *The Hartwell Paper*. "Drawing nigh obliquely" becomes the motto for the inverted, re-framed approach to climate policy. Instead of proceeding headlong to the goal of decarbonization, the authors urge a more relaxed and enjoyable course through policies with more limited (and politically palatable) objectives, that will eventually land us "right in front of" a world worth living in. In a subtle way, this "radical" perspective is implicit in the title of the *Paper* and its cover image (Figure 1): for the garden of the Hartwell House was designed by a follower of "Capability" Brown, and the estate still possesses the remnants of an "oblique" approach (History, n.d.).

Is this an over-reading – did the authors really intend to establish an identity between the indirect approach to the Hartwell House and the indirect approach proposed in *The Hartwell Paper*, an identity mediated by a paragraph of prose enacting an indirect approach? Rhetorical analyses are always open to this criticism. Confirmation can be sought from a previous effort by some of the *Hartwell* authors: *The Wrong Trousers* (Prins & Rayner, 2007). This whitepaper included the original of the paragraph on Brown's motto, quoted above, as part of an attack on the Kyoto Protocol, but in this case drawing on another example of landscape gardening: in Kyoto.

> We offer a different lesson from the city of Kyoto. It comes not from a passing caravan of international diplomacy that once visited there but from a more grounded source: from Zen Buddhism. The approach to Kinkakuji, Kyoto's famous Buddhist Golden Temple, in the north-west of the city, deliberately depresses expectations. The visitor is therefore unprepared for the splendour of the temple, and the impact of its shimmering form across the water that surrounds it being all the greater. That moment of unexpected discovery means that the memory of the beauty of Kinkakuji will live long in the mind. This is one example of a principle found across Zen architecture which tends to favour restraint – glimpses rather than panoramas – to evoke a more powerful effect: As Christopher Alexander

> and his colleagues put it, "The view of the distant sea is so restrained that it stays alive forever."
>
> Sometimes the best line of approach is not head-on, if one seeks long-lasting impact. (pp. 37–38)

The Wrong Trousers extends even further the indirect digression from policy argumentation by lingering on the contrast between the indirect approach of British and Japanese landscapes with the European "architecture of brute power" evident for example at Versailles.

> There the travel-stained ambassador approaches the Presence through a hundred yards of formal reception rooms, dripping with Baroque sculpture, shimmering with faïence and velvet. Double door after double door swings closed behind him, and the Presence remains constantly in view, along the die-straight sightline. That sort of conditioning experience was designed to awe the visitor, and was also apparent in the design of gardens and grounds. The chateau was framed by the castle gates and then approached directly, along a tree-lined boulevard, ensuring that the visitor was fully aware of the wealth and power of the owner, so literally in your face, before the butler opened the front doors. (p. 38)

"There are different ways of expressing power, some of which are more likely to gain the compliance of others," *The Wrong Trousers* concludes; "Capability Brown might be a useful mentor for climate policy designers" (pp. 38–39).

I have catalogued five strategies for creating the conditions or argumentative polylogue: "pointing out," narrative, dissociation, metaphor/analogy and enactment. "Argumentation [is] a self-regulating activity," Scott Jacobs (2000) declared; it is up to arguers to achieve the normative, epistemic and pragmatic preconditions for making arguments. But argument self-regulation is not only achieved by more argument. None of the five strategies here *argue* for a radical reframing of climate policy; none of them open a meta-debate. This shows us again that theorists of argumentation need to pay attention not only to arguments but also to all the other discourse that makes arguments possible – what I have elsewhere termed "argument-plus" (Goodwin, 2000).

The five non-argument strategies can all be joined under the heading of *evocation*. Aristotle was probably not the first to notice that sometimes it isn't argument that is needed, but perception (*Top*. 1.11). If nothing else, arguments must start from points that are not themselves argued. "Even the most rationalistic of thinkers cannot argue demonstratively for everything, 'all the way down,'" Nicholas Rescher explained; "at some point a philosopher [or any arguer] must invite assent through an appeal to sympathetic acquiescence based on experience as such" (1998, p. 322). More broadly, in the view elaborated by Michael Leff in his

OSSA and ISSA keynote addresses nearly twenty years ago, evocative discourse can actualize not only starting-points but all the conditions for argument in a complex, disagreement-filled world. Drawing on culturally resonant prototypes, evocation serves to "open situations to reasoned argument" (Leff, 2000, p. 252). Using terminology reminiscent of that in *The Hartwell Paper*, Leff explains that evocation "reframes or restructures perception of a situation" by summoning a new "recognition of the [it]…as an integral whole" through "the power of the language used in the persuasive effort" (Leff, 2003, p. 676).

While Leff, as was his wont, provided an account of evocation that emphasized its unifying and synthesizing aspects, Henry W. Johnstone, as was *his* wont (Goodwin, 2001), offered a more sober view. For communication of any kind to occur, discourse must first drive a "wedge between a person and the data of his immediate experience" (2007, p. 24). This wedge attacks "unconsciousness in all its forms: unawareness, naive acceptance, shortsightedness, complacency, blind confidence, unquestioning conformity to habits of thought and action" (p. 24). What is evoked for Johnstone is thus less a new world of shared meanings than a new consciousness alienated from what was formerly taken for granted. Constellated standpoints represent just such taken-for-granted material in civic controversies. To argue for a novel constellation requires first acknowledgement that it is arguable. And that requires driving a sharp wedge.

Leff, Rescher and Johnstone all place evocation within the province of rhetoric. I am less concerned with assigning disciplinary responsibilities. A key task in argumentation theory is to account for how arguments can get made. In this paper, I have considered the challenges faced by arguers in a world where standpoints have become locked into large-scale constellations, shutting down potential polylogues. How can polylogues get started? – what does it take to gain a hearing for a novel constellation? Arguing for the need to listen to arguments is, I have suggested, sometimes imprudent. Arguers thus have developed other strategies in order to wedge open minds and evoke new framings of a situation. The skilled authors of *The Hartwell Paper* have shown us some ways such evocation can be accomplished: by "pointing out" the manifest, inarguable failure of current perspectives, by synthesizing facts into a narrative, by dissociating new out of old meanings, by metaphors which invite imaginative reconstruction of the world, and by enacting the new attitude in the discourse itself. Two of these strategies – narrative and metaphor – have received attention from argumentation theorists who have considered what would happen if we treated them "as argument." The case study I have developed here shows the fruitfulness of an alternative approach. "Pointing out," narrative, dissociation, metaphor and enactment can be worthwhile; worthwhile sometimes because they are not arguments.

References

Aakhus, M., & Lewiński, M. (2017). Advancing polylogical analysis of large-scale argumentation: Disagreement management in the fracking controversy. *Argumentation*, 31(1), 179–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-016-9403-9

van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S.Jacobs, S. (1993). *Reconstructing argumentative discourse*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Goodwin, J. (2000). Comments on [Jacobs'] 'Rhetoric and dialectic from the standpoint of normative pragmatics'. *Argumentation*, 14, 287–292. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007805130030

Goodwin, J. (2001). Henry W. Johnstone's still unacknowledged contributions to contemporary argumentation theory. *Informal Logic*, 21, 41–50. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v21i1.2234

Goodwin, J. (2002). Designing issues. In F. H. van Eemeren, & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), *Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis* (pp. 81–96). Dordrecht: Kluwer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9948-1_7

Goodwin, J. (2019). Sophistical refutations in the climate change debates. *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 9(1), 40–64. https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.18008.goo

History [of Hartwell House]. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.hartwell-house.com/media/1677/history.pdf

Innocenti, B. (2011). Countering questionable tactics by crying foul. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 47, 178–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2011.11821745

Innocenti, B. (2007). Shaming in and into argumentation. *Argumentation*, 21, 379–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9059-6

Jackson, S. (2008). Predicaments of politicization in the debate over abstinence-only sex education. In F. H. van Eemeren, & B. Garssen (Eds.), *Controversy and confrontation: Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory* (pp. 215–230). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. https://doi.org/10.1075/cvs.6.14jac

Jacobs, S. (2000). Rhetoric and dialectic from the standpoint of normative pragmatics. *Argumentation*, 14, 261–286. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007853013191

Johnstone, H. W., Jr. (2007). The philosophical basis of rhetoric. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 40(1), 15–26. https://doi.org/10.1353/par.2007.0014

Kauffeld, F. J. (1998). Presumptions and the distribution of argumentative burdens in acts of proposing and accusing. *Argumentation*, 12(2), 245–266. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007704116379

Kauffeld, F. J. (2002). Pivotal issues and norms in rhetorical theories of argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), *Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis* (pp. 97–118). Dordrecht: Kluwer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9948-1_8

Kauffeld, F. J. (2009). What are we learning about the arguers' probative obligations. In S. Jacobs (Ed.), *Concerning argument* (pp. 1–31). Washington, D.C.: National Communication Association.

Leff, M. (2000). Rhetoric and dialectic in the twenty-first century. *Argumentation*, 14, 241–254. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007848912283

Leff, M. (2003). Rhetoric and dialectic in Martin Luther King's 'Letter from Birmingham Jail'. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), *Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation* (pp. 255–268). Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1078-8_20

Lewiński, M., & Aakhus, M. (2014). Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework: A methodological inquiry. *Argumentation*, 28(2), 161–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9307-x

Nisbet, M. (2014). Disruptive ideas: Public intellectuals and their arguments for action on climate change. *WIREs Climate Change* 5, 809–823. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.317

Paglieri, F. (2009). Ruinous arguments: Escalation of disagreement and the dangers of arguing. In J. Ritola (Ed.), *Argument cultures*. Windsor, ON: OSSA.

Paglieri, F. (2013). Choosing to argue: Towards a theory of argumentative decisions. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 59, 153–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.07.010

Paglieri, F. (2017). On the rationality of argumentative decisions. In F. Bex, F. Grasso, N. Green, F. Paglieri, & C. Reed (Eds.), *Argument technologies: Theory, analysis, and applications*. Milton Keynes: College Publications.

Paglieri, F., & Castelfranchi, C. (2010). Why argue? Towards a cost–benefit analysis of argumentation. *Argument & Computation*, 1(1), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/19462160903494584

Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation* (J. Wilkinson, & P. Weaver, Trans.). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Pew Research Center. (2014). *Political polarization in the American public: How increasing ideological uniformity and partisan antipathy affect politics, compromise and everyday life*. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/

Prins, G., & Rayner, S. (2007). *The wrong trousers: Radically rethinking climate policy*. Retrieved from http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/66/

Prins, G., Cook, M., Green, C., Hulme, M., Korhola, A., Pielke, R. A. Jr.,von Storch, H. (2009). *How to get climate policy back on course*. Retrieved from http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/92/1/Climate policy back on course.pdf

Prins, G., Galiana, I., Green, C., Grundmann, R., Hulme, M., Korhola, A.,Tezuka, H. (2010). The Hartwell paper: A new direction for climate policy after the crash of 2009. Retrieved from https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27939/1/HartwellPaper_English_version.pdf

Rescher, N. (1998). The role of rhetoric in rational argumentation. *Argumentation*, 12, 315–323. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007716519105

Rodrigues, S., Lewiński, M., & Uzelgun, M. A. (2019). Environmental manifestoes: Argumentative strategies in the Ecomodernist Manifesto. *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 9(1), 12–39. https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.18036.rod

Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(4), 103–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x

Shellenberger, M., & Nordhaus, T. (2004). *The death of environmentalism: Global warming politics in a post-environmental world*. Retrieved from http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf