Browsing All posts tagged under »normative pragmatic approach«

Norms of advocacy

June 1, 2020

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Goodwin, Jean. (2020). Norms of advocacy. In J.A. Blair & C. Tindale (Eds.), Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen (pp. 111-142). Windsor, ONT: WIndsor Studies in Argumentation.

The pragmatic force of making an argument

October 1, 2019

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Goodwin, Jean, & Innocenti, Beth (2019). The pragmatic force of making an argument. Topoi 4, 669–680. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09643-8

Demonstrating objectivity in controversial science communication: A case study of GMO scientist Kevin Folta.

October 13, 2018

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Goodwin, Jean. (2016). Demonstrating objectivity in controversial science communication: A case study of GMO scientist Kevin Folta. OSSA Conference Archive. 69. Retrieved from https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/69 Scientists can find it difficult to be seen as objective within the chaos of a civic controversy. This paper gives a normative pragmatic account of the strategy one GMO scientist used […]

The pragmatic force of making reasons apparent

September 15, 2015

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Goodwin Pragmatic ForceGoodwin, J., & Innocenti, B. (2016). The Pragmatic Force of Making Reasons Apparent. InD. Mohammed & M. Lewinski (Eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action (Vol. 2, pp. 449–462). College Publications. Making arguments makes reasons apparent. Sometimes those reasons may affect audiences. But over-emphasis on effects distracts from other things that making arguments accomplishes and thus […]

Audiences as normative roles

September 11, 2015

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Goodwin, J. (2016). Audiences as Normative Roles. In D. Mohammed & M. Lewinski (Eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action (Vol. 1, pp. 589–592). London: College Publications. Palmieri and Mazzali-Lurati have it right: audiences in argumentative transactions should be defined by the normatively-grounded roles they take. Get this paper.

How to exercise expert authority: A case study of a scientist facing The Sceptics.

September 11, 2015

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Goodwin, Jean. (2015). Comment exercer une autorité experte? Un scientifique confronté aux Sceptiques. Argumentation et Analyse du Discours, 15. Retrieved from https://aad.revues.org/2035 [How to exercise expert authority: A case study of a scientist facing The Sceptics. (2015). How to exercise expert authority: A case study of a scientist facing The Sceptics.] Argumetation theorists’ primary loyalty should be […]

Climate scientist Stephen Schneider versus the Sceptics: A case study of argumentation in deep disagreement.

September 11, 2015

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Goodwin, Jean. (2015). Climate scientist Stephen Schneider versus the Sceptics:  A case study of argumentation in deep disagreement. In Proceedings of the Eighth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Sic Sat.  Retrieved from http://rozenbergquarterly.com/issa-proceedings-2014-climate-scientist-stephen-schneider-versus-the-sceptics-a-case-study-of-argumentation-in-deep-disagreement/ 

Conceptions of speech acts in the theory and practice of argumentation

April 20, 2014

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Goodwin, Jean. (2014).  Conceptions of speech acts in the theory and practice of argumentation: A case study of a debate about advocating.  Studies in Logic, Grammar & Rhetoric, 36 (49), 79-98. Far from being of interest only to argumentation theorists, concep- tions of speech acts play an important role in practitioners’ self-reflection on their own activities. […]

Norms of advocacy

October 16, 2013

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In  Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013, edited by D. Mohammed & M. Lewiński. Windsor, ON: OSSA, 2013. This essay advances an account of the ordinary speech activity of advocating. The ethical principles developed within advocacy professions such as law […]

L’autorità di Wikipedia/The Authority of Wikipedia

July 4, 2013

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Sistemi Intelligenti 25 (2013) 9-38; very kindly translated by Fabio Paglieri from the original. Philosophers of argumentation and of testimony suggest that we can rely on what someone says because of its epistemic merits. If so, then we should never credit Wikipedia, since we cannot assess what its anonymous contributors know. I propose instead that […]